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Abstract 
In this paper, I present a unified and micro-founded explanation for various types of 
inflation without assuming ad hoc frictions or irrationality. The explanation is similar to 
the conventional inflation theory in the sense that an independent central bank can 
control inflation and also similar to the fiscal theory of the price level in the sense that a 
source of inflation lies in the behavior of government. Inflation accelerates or 
decelerates through the simultaneous optimization of a government and the 
representative household if their time preference rates are heterogeneous. This inflation 
acceleration mechanism will be prevented from working if a central bank is truly 
independent.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
     There are several types of inflation: hyperinflation, chronic inflation, disinflation, 
low and stable inflation, and deflation. Different shocks make the paths of inflation 
deviate from the stable path in various ways. Conventional inflation theory focuses on 
using monetary policy when inflation deviates from the targeted path (e.g., Svensson 
2003). The theory does not, however, sufficiently answer the fundamental question of 
why severely deviated paths like hyperinflation, chronic inflation, or deflation 
occasionally occur. In fact, if all of the agents behave rationally, it is hard to explain 
these phenomena. One of the few explanations is to assume that a government is weak, 
foolish, or untruthful. This reason has been used to explain chronic inflation. A 
government can be pressured by interest groups to take an inflationary policy stance and 
intervene in a central bank’s decision-making, and the central bank is then unable to 
fully commit to its policies, which generates the possibility of chronic inflation (e.g., 
Kydland and Prescott 1977; Barro and Gordon 1983; Rogoff 1985; Berger et al. 2000). 
The assumptions of ad hoc frictions or that households or firms are irrational to some 
extent have been used to explain hyperinflation (e.g, Cagan 1956). For example, 
hyperinflation can occur only if adaptive expectations or some ad hoc frictions are 
assumed when large budget deficits are allowed in the well-known Cagan (1956) 
framework (e.g., Auernheimer 1976; Evans and Yarrow 1981; Kiguel 1989). Neither of 
these explanations is particularly compelling because they rely on irrational behavior or 
ad hoc frictions.  
     The fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) argues that a problem with 
conventional inflation theory is that it practically neglects the importance of the 
government’s borrowing behavior in inflation dynamics (e.g., Leeper 1991; Sims 1994, 
1998, 2001; Woodford 1995, 2001; Cochrane 1998a, 1998b, 2005).1 It has been argued 
that, if a government borrows money without limits, inflation will eventually explode 
(e.g., Sargent and Wallace 1981). The FTPL implies that, if a government’s borrowing 
behavior is well modeled, the mechanism of severely deviated inflation paths (e.g., 
hyperinflation, chronic inflation, or deflation) can be explained without assuming ad 
                                                        
1 See also Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000), Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000), and Gordon and Leeper (2002). 
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hoc frictions or irrationality. Most FTPL models have not, however, explicitly modeled 
the behavior of government in detail. Hence, some critics contend that the theory is 
fallacious (e.g., Kocherlakota and Phelan 1999; McCallum 2001, 2003; Buiter 2002, 
2004; Niepelt 2004). 
     If, however, the government’s borrowing behavior is modeled properly and 
explicitly, it may be possible to use the FTPL to explain the common mechanism of 
various types of inflation. My purpose in this paper is to explore this possibility. First, I 
examine the nature of the government budget constraint in detail and then construct a 
model that fully incorporates the government’s borrowing behavior. The important 
features of the model are that (1) both the government and the representative household 
achieve simultaneous optimization and (2) the roles of government and the central bank 
are explicitly separated. Because of the first feature, I do not need to assume ad hoc 
friction or irrationality. Moreover, although the roles of government and the central 
bank are different (as the second feature shows), both government and the central bank 
are responsible for the development of inflation. These characteristics indicate that the 
model has characteristics of both conventional inflation theory and the FTPL. Similar to 
conventional inflation theory, an independent central bank can control inflation by 
manipulating the nominal interest rate with a target rate of inflation. At the same time, 
similar to the FTPL, the behavior of government represents a source of inflation.  
     The model presented here indicates that inflation accelerates or decelerates if the 
time preference rates of the government and the representative household are 
heterogeneous. Because a government represents the median of households under a 
proportional representation system and the economically representative household 
represents the mean of households, the preferences between them are usually 
heterogeneous. Given these heterogeneous preferences, it is not possible for both of 
them to achieve simultaneous optimization if inflation is constant. The model indicates 
that inflation must accelerate or decelerate for the government and the representative 
household to be able to achieve simultaneous optimization. Simultaneous optimization 
is possible because the acceleration or deceleration of inflation changes the 
government’s borrowing behavior. The problem therefore is not one of irrationality or 
friction but one of preference. Because it is hard for a government to control its own 
preferences even if it behaves in a fully rational manner, an independent central bank is 
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necessary to prevent this inflation acceleration mechanism from working. The 
combination of the inflation acceleration mechanism and various degrees of central 
bank independence gives us a unified and micro-founded explanation for various types 
of inflation without ad hoc assumptions of friction or irrationality. 
     The paper is organized as follows. In section II, I examine the nature of the 
government budget constraint and construct a model that assumes an economically 
Leviathan government in which the government and the representative household 
achieve simultaneous optimization. The natures of the simultaneous optimization and 
the inflation acceleration mechanism are examined in section III. In section IV, I look at 
how the independent central bank influences inflation dynamics. In section V, I show 
that the model can provide a unified and micro-founded explanation for various types of 
inflation. Finally, I offer concluding remarks in section VI. 
 
II. THE MODEL 
 
1. The government budget constraint 
     The government budget constraint is a key element in the explanation for inflation 
in this paper. The budget constraint is 
tttttt SXGRBB --+= , 
where Bt is the nominal obligation of the government to pay for its accumulated bonds, 
Rt is the nominal interest rate for government bonds, Gt is the nominal government 
expenditure, Xt is the nominal tax revenue, and St is the nominal amount of seigniorage 
at time t. The tax is assumed to be lump sum, the government bonds are long term, and 
the returns on the bonds are realized only after the bonds are held during a unit period 
(e.g., a year). The government bonds are redeemed in a unit period, and the government 
successively refinances the bonds by issuing new ones at each time t. Let 
t
t
t P
Bb = , 
t
t
t P
Gg = , 
t
t
t P
Xx = , and 
t
t
t P
Ss = , where Pt is the price level at time t. Let also 
t
t
t P
Pπ
=  be 
the inflation rate at time t. By dividing by Pt, the budget constraint is transformed to 
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ttttt
t
t sxgRb
P
B --+= , which is equivalent to  
( ) tttttttttttttt sxgπRbπbsxgRbb --+-=---+= . 
     Because the returns on government bonds are realized only after holding the 
bonds during a unit period, investors buy the bonds if ( )dsrπER t
t tstt ò + +³ 1  at time t, 
where tR  is the nominal interest rate for bonds bought at t and rt is the real interest rate 
in markets at t. Hence, by arbitrage, ( )dsrπER t
t tstt ò + += 1  and rdsπER tt stt += ò +1  if rt is 
constant such that rt = r (i.e., if it is at steady state). The nominal interest rate 
rdsπER t
t stt
+= ò +1  means that, during a sufficiently small period between t and t + dt, 
the government’s obligation to pay for the bonds’ return in the future increases not by 
( )rπdt t +  but by ÷øöçèæ +ò + rdsπEdt tt st 1 . If πt is constant, then rdsπErπ tt stt +=+ ò +1  and 
dsπEπ t
t stt ò += 1 , but if πt is not constant, these equations do not necessarily hold. 
     Since bonds are redeemed in a unit period and successively refinanced, the bonds 
the government is holding at t have been issued between 1-t  and t. Hence, under 
perfect foresight, the average nominal interest rate for all government bonds at time t is 
the weighted sum of tR  such that =÷÷
÷
ø
ö
çç
ç
è
æ
= ò ò- -
ds
dvB
B
RR
t
t t
t tv
ts
st 1
1 ,
,  
rds
dvB
B
dvπt
t t
t tv
tss
s v
+÷÷
÷
ø
ö
çç
ç
è
æ
ò òò- -
+
1
1 ,
,1 , where tsB ,  is the nominal value of bonds at time t 
that were issued at time s. If the weights 
ò -tt tv
ts
dvB
B
1 ,
,  between 1-t  and t are not so 
different from each other, then approximately rdsdvπR t
t
s
s vt
+= ò ò- +1 1 . To be precise, if 
the absolute values of sπ  for 11 +£<- tst  are sufficiently smaller than unity, the 
differences among the weights are negligible and then approximately 
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rdsdvπR t
t
s
s vt
+= ò ò- +1 1  (see Appendix 1).2 The average nominal interest rate for the 
total government bonds, therefore, develops by rdsdvπR t
t
s
s vt
+= ò ò- +1 1 . If tπ  is constant, 
then t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπ =ò ò- +1 1 ; thus, rπR tt += . If tπ  is not constant, however, the equations 
t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπ =ò ò- +1 1  and rπR tt +=  do not necessarily hold.  
  
2. An economically Leviathan government  
    Under a proportional representation system, the government represents the median 
household whereas the representative household from an economic perspective 
represents the mean household.3 Because of this difference, they usually have different 
preferences. To account for this essential difference, a Leviathan government is 
assumed in the model. 4  There are two extremely different views regarding 
government’s behavior in the literature on political economy: the Leviathan view and 
the benevolent view (e.g., Downs 1957; Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Alesina and 
Cukierman 1990). From an economic point of view, a benevolent government 
maximizes the expected economic utility of the representative household, but a 
Leviathan government does not. Whereas the expenditure of a benevolent government is 
a tool used to maximize the economic utility of the representative household, the 
expenditure of a Leviathan government is a tool used to achieve the government’s own 
policy objectives.5 For example, if a Leviathan government considers national security 
                                                        
2 If the absolute values of sπ  for 11 +£<- tst   are very large, the weight ò -tt tv
tt
dvB
B
1 ,
,  will be 
much larger than 
ò -
-
t
t tv
tt
dvB
B
1 ,
,1  when πt is increasing. In this case, tR  will be closer to rdsπ
t
t s
+ò +1  
than rdsdvπt
t
s
s v
+ò ò- +1 1 . 
3 See the literature on the median voter theorem (e.g., Downs 1957). Also see the literature on the delay 
in reforms (e.g., Alesina and Drazen 1991; Cukierman et al. 1992). 
4 The most prominent reference to Leviathan governments is Brennan and Buchanan (1980). 
5  The government behavior assumed in the FTPL reflects an aspect of a Leviathan government. 
Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) argue that non-Ricardian policies correspond to the type of policies in 
which governments are viewed as selecting policies and committing themselves to those policies in 
advance of prices being determined in markets. 
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to be the most important political issue, defense spending will increase greatly, but if 
improving social welfare is the top political priority, spending on social welfare will 
increase dramatically, even though the increased expenditures may not necessarily 
increase the economic utility of the representative household. 
     Is it possible, however, for such a Leviathan government to hold office for a long 
period? Yes, because a government is generally chosen by the median of households 
under a proportional representation system (e.g., Downs 1957), whereas the 
representative household usually presumed in the economics literature is the mean 
household. The economically representative household is not usually identical to the 
politically representative household, and a majority of people could support a Leviathan 
government even if they know that the government does not necessarily pursue only the 
economic objectives of the economically representative household. In other words, the 
Leviathan government argued here is an economically Leviathan government that 
maximizes the political utility of people, whereas the conventional economically 
benevolent government maximizes the economic utility of people. In addition, because 
the politically and economically representative households are different (the median and 
mean households, respectively), the preferences of future governments will also be 
similarly different from those of the mean representative household. In this sense, the 
current and future governments presented in the model can be seen as a combined 
government that goes on indefinitely; that is, the economically Leviathan government 
always represents the median representative household. 
     The Leviathan view generally requires the explicit inclusion of government 
expenditure, tax revenue, or related activities in the government’s political utility 
function (e.g., Edwards and Keen 1996). Because an economically Leviathan 
government derives political utility from expenditure for its political purposes, the 
larger the expenditure is, the happier the Leviathan government will be. But raising tax 
rates will provoke people’s antipathy, which increases the probability of being replaced 
by the opposing party that also nearly represents the median household. Thus, the 
economically Leviathan government regards taxes as necessary costs to obtain freedom 
of expenditure for its own purposes. The government therefore will derive utility from 
expenditure and disutility from taxes. Expenditure and taxes in the political utility 
function of the government are analogous to consumption and labor hours in the 
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economic utility function of the representative household. Consumption and labor hours 
are both control variables, and as such, the government’s expenditure and tax revenue 
are also control variables. As a whole, the political utility function of economically 
Leviathan government can be expressed as ( )ttG x,gu .6 In addition, it can be assumed 
on the basis of previously mentioned arguments that 0>¶
¶
t
G
g
u  and 02
2
<¶
¶
t
G
g
u , and 
therefore that  0<¶
¶
t
G
x
u and 02
2
>¶
¶
t
G
x
u . 7  An economically Leviathan government 
therefore maximizes the expected sum of these utilities discounted by its time 
preference rate under the constraint of deficit financing; that is, it maximizes its 
expected political utility subject to the budget constraint. 
 
3. Optimization problems 
     The optimization problem of an economically Leviathan government is  
( ) ( )dttθ,xguEMax GttG -ò ¥ exp00  
subject to the budget constraint 
( ) ttttttt sxgπRbb --+-= , 
where Gu  is the constant relative risk aversion utility function of the government and 
Gθ  is the government’s rate of time preference. All variables are expressed in per capita 
terms, and population is assumed to be constant. The government maximizes its 
                                                        
6 It is possible to assume that governments are partially benevolent. In this case, the utility function of a 
government can be assumed to be ( )ttttG l,c,x,gu , where tc is real consumption and tl  is the leisure 
hours of the representative household. However, if a lump-sum tax is imposed, the government’s policies 
do not affect steady-state consumption and leisure hours. In this case, the utility function can be assumed 
to be ( )ttG x,gu . 
7 Some may argue that it is more likely that 0>¶
¶
t
G
x
u and 02
2
<¶
¶
t
G
x
u . However, the assumption used is 
not an important issue here because 
( )
( ) 0
2
2
=
¶
¶
¶
¶
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
x
x
x
,xgu
x
,xgux   at steady state, as will be shown in the 
solution to the optimization problem later in the paper. Thus, the results are not affected by which 
assumption is used.  
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expected political utility considering the behavior of the economically representative 
household that is reflected in Rt in its budget constraint.8 
     In contrast, the economically representative household maximizes its expected 
economic utility. Sidrauski (1967)’s well-known money in the utility function model is 
used for the optimization problem. The representative household maximizes its 
expected utility 
( ) ( )dttθm,cuE PttP -ò ¥ exp00  
subject to the budget constraint 
( ) ( )[ ] tttttttttt gmrπcτwara -++-++= ,9 
where Pu  and Pθ  are the utility function and the time preference rate of the 
representative household, ct is real consumption, wt is real wage, τt is lump-sum real 
government transfers, mt is real money, ttt mka += , and kt is real capital. It is 
assumed that ( )tt kfr ¢= , ( ) ( )tttt kfkkfw ¢-= , 0>'uP , 0<"uP , ( ) 0>¶
¶
t
ttP
m
m,cu , and 
( ) 02
2
<¶
¶
t
ttP
m
m,cu , where ( )·f  is the production function. Government expenditure (gt) is 
an exogenous variable for the representative household because it is an economically 
Leviathan government. It is also assumed that lump-sum government transfers (τt) is 
equal to the seigniorage (st), and that, although all households receive transfers from a 
government in equilibrium, when making decisions, each household takes the amount it 
receives as given, independent of its money holdings. Thus, the budget constraint means 
that the real output ( )tkf  at any time is demanded for the real consumption ct, the real 
investment tk , and the real government expenditure gt such that ( ) tttt gkckf ++=  . The 
representative household maximizes its expected economic utility considering the 
behavior of government reflected in gt in the budget constraint. In this discussion, a 
central bank is not assumed to be independent of the government; thus, the functions of 
the government and the central bank are not separated. This assumption can be relaxed, 
and the roles of the government and the central bank are explicitly separated in section 
                                                        
8 The model can be used to analyze various inflation phenomena (see Harashima 2004b, 2005, 2006, 
2007a, 2007b). 
9 The constraint is equivalent to ( ) ( )[ ] ( )ttttttttttttttt πRbsxbmrπcτwara -+---++-++=  . 
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IV. 
     Note that the time preference rate of government ( Gθ ) is not necessarily identical 
to that of the representative household ( Pθ ) because the government and the 
representative household represent different households (i.e., the median and mean 
households, respectively). In addition, the preferences will differ because (1) even 
though people want to choose a government that has the same time preference rate as 
the representative household, the rates may differ owing to errors in expectations (e.g., 
Alesina and Cukierman 1990); and (2) current voters cannot bind the choices of future 
voters and, if current voters are aware of this possibility, they may vote more 
myopically as compared with their own rates of impatience in private economic 
activities (e.g., Tabellini and Alesina 1990). Hence, it is highly likely that the time 
preference rates of a government and the representative household are heterogeneous. It 
should be also noted, however, that even though the rates of time preference are 
heterogeneous, an economically Leviathan government behaves based only on its own 
time preference rate, without hesitation. 
 
III. THE INFLATION ACCELERATION MECHANISM 
 
1. The simultaneous optimization 
     First, I examine the optimization problem of the representative household. Let 
Hamiltonian PH  be ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ttttttttttP,PttPP gmrπcτwarλtθm,cuH -+--+++-= exp , 
where tP,λ  is a costate variable, ct and mt are control variables, and at is a state variable. 
The optimality conditions for the representative household are  
(1) ( ) ( ) tP,P
t
ttP λtθ
c
m,cu =-¶
¶ exp , 
(2) ( ) ( ) ( )tttP,P
t
ttP rπλtθ
m
m,cu +=-¶
¶ exp , 
(3) ttP,tP, rλλ -= ,      
(4) ( ) ( )[ ]ttttttttt gmrπcτwraa -++-++= , and       
(5) 0lim =
¥® ttP,t
aλ .    
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By conditions (1) and (2), 
( )
( ) tt
t
ttP
t
ttP
rπ
c
m,cu
m
m,cu
+=
¶
¶
¶
¶
, and by conditions (1) and (3), 
( )
( ) tP
t
t
t
ttP
t
ttP
t
rθ
c
c
c
m,cu
c
m,cuc
=+
¶
¶
¶
¶
- 
2
2
. Hence, 
(6) rrθ tP ==   
at steady state such that 0=tc  and 0=tk . 
     Next, I examine the optimization problem of the economically Leviathan 
government. Let Hamiltonian GH  be ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tttttttG,GttGG sxgπRbλtθx,guH --+-+-= exp , 
where tG,λ  is a costate variable. The optimality conditions for the government are  
(7) ( ) ( ) tG,G
t
ttG λtθ
g
x,gu -=-¶
¶ exp ,  
(8) ( ) ( ) tG,G
t
ttG λtθ
x
x,gu =-¶
¶ exp ,     
(9) ( )tttG,tG, πRλλ --= ,   
(10) ( ) ttttttt sxgπRbb --+-= , and  
(11) 0lim =
¥® ttG,t
bλ .       
Combining conditions (7), (8), and (9) yields the following equations: 
( )
( ) t
t
t
s
s vtttG
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
πdsdvπrπRθ
g
g
g
x,gu
g
x,gug
-+=-=+
¶
¶
¶
¶
ò ò- +1 1
2
2
  and 
( )
( ) =-=+
¶
¶
¶
¶
- ttG
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
πRθ
x
x
x
x,gu
x
x,gux 2
2
 
t
t
t
s
s vt
πdsdvπr -+ ò ò- +1 1  because ttt ss vt rdsdvπR += ò ò- +1 1  (as shown in section II). Here, 
( )
( ) 0
2
2
=
¶
¶
¶
¶
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
g
g
g
x,gu
g
x,gug   and 
( )
( ) 0
2
2
=
¶
¶
¶
¶
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
x
x
x
x,gu
x
x,gux   at steady state such that 0=tg  
and 0=tx ; thus, ttt
s
s vtG
πdsdvπrθ -+= ò ò- +1 1 . Hence, by equation (6), 
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(12) PGt
t
t
s
s v
θθπdsdvπ -+=ò ò- +1 1  
at steady state such that 0=tg , 0=tx , 0=tc , and 0=tk .10   
     Equation (12) is a natural consequence of simultaneous optimization by the 
economically Leviathan government and the representative household. If the rates of 
time preference are heterogeneous between them, then t
t
t
s
s vt
πdsdvπrR ¹=- ò ò- +1 1 . 
This result may seem surprising because it has been naturally conjectured that 
t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπ =ò ò- +1 1  and that rπR tt += . However, this is a simple misunderstanding 
because tπ  indicates the instantaneous rate of inflation at a point such that 
t
t
t P
Pπ
= , 
whereas dsdvπt
t
s
s vò ò- +1 1  roughly indicates a total price change by inflation during a 
unit period. Equation (12) indicates that tπ  develops according to the integral equation 
PG
t
t
s
s vt
θθdsdvππ +-= ò ò- +1 1 . When tπ  is constant, the equations ttt ss v πdsdvπ =ò ò- +1 1  
and rπR tt +=  are true. However, if tπ  is not constant, the equations do not 
necessarily hold. Equation (12) indicates that the equations t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπ =ò ò- +1 1  and 
rπR tt +=  hold only in the case where PG θθ =  (i.e., a homogeneous rate of time 
preference). It has been previously thought that a homogeneous rate of time preference 
naturally prevails; thus, the equation rπR tt +=  has not been questioned. As argued 
previously, however, a homogeneous rate of time preference is not usually guaranteed. 
 
2. The law of motion for price 
     Equation (12) indicates that inflation accelerates or decelerates when the rates of 
time preference are heterogeneous. If tπ  is constant, the equation 
dsdvππ t
t
s
s vt ò ò- += 1 1  holds; conversely, if dsdvππ tt ss vt ò ò- +¹ 1 1 , then tπ  is not constant. 
                                                        
10  If and only if 
t
ttt
G b
sxgθ ---=  at steady state, then the transversality condition (11) 
0lim =
¥® ttG,t
bλ  holds. The proof is shown in Appendix 2. 
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Without the acceleration or deceleration of inflation, therefore, equation (12) cannot 
hold in an economy in which PG θθ ¹ . That is, inflation accelerates or decelerates as a 
result of the government and the representative household reconciling the contradiction 
in heterogeneous rates of time preference. 
     The integral equation PG
t
t
s
s vt
θθdsdvππ +-= ò ò- +1 1  implies that inflation accelerates 
or decelerates nonlinearly in the case in which PG θθ ¹  such that 
( ) ( )[ ]tzθθyππ tPGt lnexp0 -+= , where y is a constant and zt is a time dependent variable. 
For example, a solution of this integral equation is ( ) 20 6 tθθππ PGt -+= . For a 
sufficiently small period between 1+t  and dtt ++1 , dttπ ++1  is determined with 
sπ ( )11 +£<- tst  that satisfies ttt ss v πdsdvπ -ò ò- +1 1  PG θθ -= , so as to hold the equation 
=ò ò+ + dsdvπdttt ss v1 tdttdttt ss v ππdsdvπ -+ ++-- +ò ò11 1 . Suppose that initially PG θθ = , then 
Gθ  changes at time 0, and Gθ  and Pθ  are not identical from that time. Because πt is 
constant before 0=t , then =ò ò- + dsdvπtt ss v1 1 ( ) dsdvπππ s vò ò- + -+ 01 10 00  at 0=t . 
Here, I assume that ytππ t += 0  for 10 <£ t  for πt to be continuous (y is a constant). 
Thus, ( )tθθππ PGt -+= 60  for 10 <£ t . After 1=t , πt gradually departs from 
the path of ( )tθθππ PGt -+= 60 , upward if PG θθ >  and downward if PG θθ < , 
such that ( ) ( )[ ]tzθθππ tPGt lnexp60 -+=  where 1>tz , so as to hold 
PGt
t
t
s
s v
θθπdsdvπ -=-ò ò- +1 1 . Although a solution of the integral equation 
PG
t
t
s
s vt
θθdsdvππ +-= ò ò- +1 1  is ( ) 20 6 tθθππ PGt -+= , the path of inflation 
( ) ( )[ ]tzθθππ tPGt lnexp60 -+=  approaches the path 
(13) ( ) 20 3 tθθππ PGt -+=  
as time passes because of the boundary condition that πt is constant before 0=t .  
     It should be stressed that inflation must be constant unless PG θθ ¹ , and it is not 
until PG θθ ¹  that inflation can accelerate or decelerate. That is, PG θθ ¹  bends the 
path of inflation and makes it nonlinear, which enables inflation to accelerate or 
decelerate. Equation (13) can be also interpreted as the difference of time preference 
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rates PG θθ -  at time t is transformed to the accelerated or decelerated inflation tπ  at 
time t. The many episodes of accelerating and decelerating inflation across countries 
and time periods imply that the condition in which PG θθ ¹  is not rare. 
 
3. The mechanism of inflation acceleration  
     In this subsection, I explore the inflation acceleration (or deceleration) 
mechanism in greater detail.  
 
3.1. Necessity of reconciling heterogeneous discount factors  
     The sum of the government’s real expenditure, the representative household’s real 
consumption, and the real investment is equal to the real output at any time, as shown in 
the budget constraint of the representative household such that ( ) tttt gkckf ++=  . 
Hence, the streams of expenditure and consumption are not determined independently 
of each other and should be consistent with the stream of the output. However, if the 
discount factors ( Gθ  and Pθ ) are different, there is no guarantee that the streams are 
consistent; that is, there is no guarantee that both transversality conditions of the 
government and the representative household (equations [5] and [11]) are satisfied and 
that both expected utilities are maximized simultaneously. For example, the expected 
utility of the representative household is maximized if the point Pθr =  is at steady state 
as usual and as equation (6) shows. However, if PG θθ ¹ , it is not rational for the 
government to stop changing its real expenditures, taxes, and borrowing at the point 
where Pθr = . The government’s expected utility will increase by changing them even if 
Pθr =  because GP θθr ¹= . The government’s behavior obstructs the optimization of 
the representative household, but it is completely rational behavior for the government. 
Therefore, this contradiction of discount factors should be reconciled by some 
mechanism to make the streams consistent (except for corner solutions) and to make 
both the government and the representative household able to achieve simultaneous 
optimization.  
     The easiest way to achieve a steady state in an economy when discount factors are 
heterogeneous is to expel the government from markets, but that is impossible. Unless a 
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way is found that enables the government and the representative household to coexist at 
steady states (other than corner solutions), the economy may break down. For them to 
be able to coexist at steady states, the government should stop changing its real 
borrowing at the point where GP θθr ¹= . Hence, if there is a mechanism that penalizes 
the government for having Gθ  unequal to Pθ  and makes it refrain from changing its 
real borrowing at the point where GP θθr ¹= , coexistence will be possible. Equation 
(13) indicates that the mechanism for penalizing the government does indeed exist—the 
acceleration or deceleration of inflation. I explain how this mechanism works in section 
3.2. 
 
3.2. Moved up real obligations  
     Suppose for simplicity that PG θθ > . Inflation accelerates by equation (13) 
because of the heterogeneous discount factors. Equation (13) indicates that the 
government’s existing real obligation bt increases at a higher rate than r by 
( )0
1
1 >-ò ò- + ttt ss v πdsdvπ  because the real obligation increases by ( ) =--+-= ttttttt sxgπRbb  
tttt
t
t
s
s vtt
sxgπdsdvπrb --+÷ø
öçè
æ -+ò ò- +1 1  as shown in the real government budget constraint. This 
higher rate of increase in the real obligation by t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπ -ò ò- +1 1 , a result of accelerating 
inflation, indicates the government’s penalty for having higher Gθ  than Pθ . 
     Note, however, that the real rate of return on investments in government bonds is 
always r regardless of the acceleration of inflation because ( ) =-ò + dsπRtt st1  
rdsπrdsπ t
t s
t
t s
=-+ òò ++ 11 . When inflation accelerates, the increased rate of the 
government’s real obligation bt at time t is not r, however, but t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπr -+ ò ò- +1 1  
because increases in the real obligation are moved forward in time (or “moved up”) by 
the acceleration of inflation. Figure 1 shows the increases in the real obligation at each 
time during a unit period for bonds issued at t, tB , the real value of which at time t is 
tb  when inflation is accelerating. Because the nominal interest rate dsπrR
t
t st ò ++= 1  
indicates that the government’s nominal obligation to pay for the bonds’ return in the 
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future increases at the constant rate dsπr t
t sò ++ 1  between t and 1+t , then the real 
obligation expands at a time-varying rate between t and 1+t  such that 
v
t
t s
πdsπr -+ ò +1  owing to the accelerating rate of inflation πt. Clearly the line of the 
increases in the real obligation should slope down to the right as shown in Figure 1. 
Hence, the rate of increase in the real obligation at time t is higher than r. The increases 
in the real obligation are moved up by the acceleration of inflation, holding the total 
increase in the real obligation during a unit period between t and 1+t  to tbr . 
     However, the moved up increases in the real obligation mean that the increases in 
the real obligation become smaller later in a unit period for each bond. Thus, because 
bonds issued between t - 1 and t offset each other, does the rate of increase in the real 
obligation of total government borrowing remain r at any time? It does not, because the 
degree of moving up increases as inflation accelerates. Figure 2 shows the effect of the 
increasing moving up. Because the rate of inflation increases by the square of time as 
shown in equation (13), more increases in the real obligation are moved up as time 
passes. As a result, the increases in real obligation cannot be indefinitely offset 
completely by the smaller increases in the real obligation of bonds issued in the past. 
Figure 3 shows the increases in the real obligation of bonds issued between t - 1 and t at 
time t (i.e., the increases in the real obligation of tstB ,1+-  for 10 £< s , the real value of 
which at time t is tstb ,1+- ). Here, tstb ,1+-  is constant at steady state, b . Hence, the 
increases in the real obligation of the total government bonds at time t is br  plus the 
area of triangle ABC minus the area of triangle CDE in Figure 3. The area of triangle 
ABC is larger than the area of triangle CDE because the degree of moving up increases 
as time passes. Thus the rate of increase in real obligation of the total government 
borrowing at time t (i.e., s
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπr -+ ò ò- +1 1 ) is larger than r for any future t 
indefinitely. The government therefore must continue to face rates of increase in real 
obligation higher than r by t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπ -ò ò- +1 1  at all points in the future.  
 
3.3. Optimal behaviors of the government and the representative household 
     The government optimally plans its streams of future real expenditures, taxes, and 
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borrowings subject to this moved up higher rate of increase in the real obligation for a 
future t. The government stops changing its real expenditures, taxes, and borrowing if 
the rate of increase in the real obligation t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπr -+ ò ò- +1 1  equals the 
government’s time preference rate Gθ . The rate at which the real obligation increases 
therefore is a crucial variable in determining the government’s behavior. As equations 
(6) and (12) show, equations rθP =  and =Gθ ttt
s
s v
πdsdvπr -+ ò ò- +1 1  hold 
simultaneously at steady state. That is, both the government and the representative 
household can achieve simultaneous optimization. In this sense, the rate at which the 
real obligation increases is a crucial variable not only for the government but for the 
entire economy. 
     The mechanism by which the government stops changing its real borrowing at the 
point where GP θθr ¹=  implies that the government is penalized if it has a higher time 
preference rate than the representative household. The penalized government is obliged 
to refrain from changing its real borrowing at the point rθP =  facing =Gθ  
t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπr -+ ò ò- +1 1 . Therefore, with the penalty, ttt ss v πdsdvπ -ò ò- +1 1  the contradiction 
of discount factors between the government and the representative household is 
reconciled, and the government is penalized by the representative household by its 
expectation of accelerating inflation so as to prevent the economy from breaking down.  
    Determining behavior on the basis of the rate at which the real obligation increases, 
as equations (12) and (13) indicate, is optimal for the government as well as for the 
representative household. This is still true even if it is assumed that a government can 
perceive less moved up real obligations (i.e., perceive less penalty) in the sense of a less 
steep slope in Figure 1 (i.e., the government can behave on the basis of a lower Rt than 
equation [13] indicates). This is true because, if such a government seeks to exploit the 
opportunity of higher expected utility by intentionally perceiving a lower rate of 
increase in the real obligation, then Gθ  is always higher than the rate of increase in the 
real obligation. Therefore, the representative household cannot achieve optimality at the 
point where Pθr = . To prevent this consequence, the representative household 
penalizes the government more heavily by expecting more rapid inflation acceleration 
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than equation (13) shows and makes the rate of increase in the real obligation the 
government perceives identical to Gθ . Note here that equations (12) and (13) concern 
only price level changes and are unrelated to real values, and real values are thus 
unaffected as long as the rate of increase in the real obligation the government perceives 
is identical to Gθ , irrespective of how the values of Rt and the penalty are perceived by 
the government. Hence, the government cannot achieve the higher expected utility by 
intentionally perceiving less moved up real obligations, which will only result in a more 
rapid acceleration of inflation. Conversely, if the representative household penalizes the 
government more heavily than equation (13) shows to exploit the opportunity of a 
higher expected utility, then Gθ  is always lower than the rate of increase in the real 
obligation and thereby the government cannot achieve optimality. To prevent this 
consequence, the government changes itself to perceive less moved up real obligations 
and makes the rate of increase in the real obligation identical to Gθ . Hence, the 
representative household cannot achieve the higher expected utility by penalizing the 
government more heavily, which also only results in more rapid acceleration of inflation. 
As a result, even if it is assumed that a government can wilfully perceive less moved up 
real obligations, in the sense of a less steep slope in Figure 1, equation (13) gives both 
the government and the representative household the least inflation acceleration for the 
highest expected utilities. In this sense, the strategy profile that both the government and 
the representative household do not seek to exploit these opportunities is a Nash 
equilibrium. Both know this mechanism well and expect inflation to accelerate as 
equation (13) indicates when they perceive that PG θθ > . 
 
IV. CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 
 
1. The power of a central bank to control a government 
     In the previous sections, central banks are not explicitly considered because they 
are not assumed to be independent of governments. However, in actuality, central banks 
are independent organizations in most countries even though some of them may be 
merely partially independent. Furthermore, in the conventional models of inflation, it is 
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the central banks that control inflation and governments have no role in controlling 
inflation. Conventional models of inflation show that the rate of inflation basically 
converges at the target rate of inflation set by a central bank. The target rate of inflation 
therefore is the key exogenous variable that determines the path of inflation in the 
models.  
     Both the government and the central bank can probably affect the development of 
inflation, but they would do so in different manners, as equation (13) and conventional 
inflation models indicate. However, the objectives of the government and the central 
bank may not be the same. For example, if equation (13) is added to conventional 
models, inflation cannot necessarily converge at the target rate of inflation because 
another key exogenous variable ( Gθ ) is included in the models. A government makes 
inflation develop by equation (13), which implies that inflation will not necessarily 
converge at the target rate of inflation. Conversely, a central bank makes inflation 
converge at the target rate of inflation, which implies that inflation will not necessarily 
develop as equation (13) indicates. That is, unless either Gθ  is adjusted to be consistent 
with the target rate of inflation or the target rate of inflation is adjusted to be consistent 
with Gθ , the path of inflation cannot necessarily be determined. Either Gθ  or the 
target rate of inflation need be an endogenous variable. If a central bank dominates, the 
target rate of inflation remains as the key exogenous variable and Gθ  should then be an 
endogenous variable. The reverse is also true.  
     Consider a conventional discrete-time inflation model with a backward-looking 
Phillips curve. It consists of an aggregate supply function, 111 +++ +++= ttztxtt εxαππ ωα ; 
an aggregate demand function, ( ) 111 +++ +--+= ttrtztxt ηrrβxβx ωβ ; and a Taylor-type 
instrument rule for a central bank, ( ) tx*tπt xγππγγi +-+= (e.g., Svensson 2003); 
where xt is the output gap; ωt is a column vector of exogenous variables; rt is the real 
interest rate; r is the real interest rate at steady state; it is the nominal interest rate; π* is 
the target rate of inflation; αx, βx, βr, γ , γπ, and γx are constant coefficients; αz and βz are 
row vectors of constant coefficients; εt and ηt are i.i.d. shocks with zero mean; and 
00 =ε  and 00 =η . The real interest rate is defined as follows: |tttt πir 1+-º , where 
|ttπ 1+  is the rate of inflation that is expected in period t for period 1+t , and 
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rπγ * +=  as is usually assumed. It is assumed that rr tst =+ |  for any s (s = 1,2,3,…). 
Consider also an extended model that combines the above conventional model with 
equation (13). Here, the equation ttPt μrμθr +=+=  holds at equilibrium with 
random shocks, where μt is i.i.d. shocks with zero mean and 00 =μ . Thus, equation (13) 
in a discrete-time model with random shocks can be expressed as =+1tπ  
( )( ) 11
1
22
0 313 +
+
=
+-+-+ å tt
v
vG ξμvtrθπ  where ξt is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and 
00 =ξ . The extended model that includes this discrete-time version of equation (13) 
indicates that approximately 
(14) =- rGq ( )[ ]( )02 1213 1 ππttβ β *x x -++- - ,  
which implies that either the target rate of inflation (π*) or the time preference rate of 
government ( Gθ ) needs to be an endogenous variable (see Appendix 3). 
     A central bank will be regarded as truly independent if Gθ  is forced to be 
adjusted to the one that is consistent with the target rate of inflation set by the central 
bank. For example, suppose that PG θθ >  and a truly independent central bank 
manipulates the nominal interest rate according to the Taylor-type instrument rule in the 
above extended model. If the accelerating inflation rate is higher than the target rate of 
inflation, the central bank can raise the nominal interest rate from 
tG
t
t
s
s vt
πθrdsdvπR +=+= ò ò- +1 1  to ( )0>++= ψψπθR tGt  by intervening in financial 
markets to lower the accelerating rate of inflation. In this case, the central bank keeps 
the initial target rate of inflation because it is truly independent. The government thus 
faces a rate of increase of real obligation that is higher than Gθ  by the extra rate ψ.11 If 
the government lowers Gθ  so that PG θθ <  and inflation stops accelerating, the central 
bank will accordingly reduce the extra rate ψ. If, however, the government does not 
accommodate Gθ  to the target rate of inflation, the extra rate ψ will increase as time 
                                                        
11 The extra rate ψ affects not only the behavior of government but also that of the representative 
household, in which the conventional inflation theory is particularly interested. In this sense, the central 
bank’s instrument rule that concerns and simultaneously affects both behaviors of the government and the 
representative household is particularly important for price stability. 
 20
passes because of the gap between the accelerating inflation rate and the target rate of 
inflation widens by equation (13) and γx in Taylor-type instrument rules is usually larger 
than unity, say 1.5. Because of the extra rate ψ, the government has no other way to 
achieve optimization unless it lowers Gθ  to one that is consistent with the target rate of 
inflation.  
 
2. The necessity of an independent neutral organization to control the 
government’s preferences 
     Equation (13) implies that a government allows inflation to accelerate because it 
acts to maximize its expected utility based only on its own preferences. A government is 
hardly the only entity that cannot easily control its own preferences even when these 
preferences may result in unfavorable consequences. It may not even be possible to 
manipulate one’s own preferences at will. Thus, even though a government is fully 
rational and is not weak, foolish, or untruthful, it is difficult for it to self-regulate its 
preferences. Hence, an independent neutral organization is needed to help control Gθ . 
Delegating the authority to set and keep the target rate of inflation to an independent 
central bank is a way to control Gθ . The delegated independent central bank will 
control Gθ  because it is not the central bank’s preference to stabilize the price level—it 
is simply a duty delegated to it. An independent central bank is not the only possible 
choice. For example, pegging the local currency with a foreign currency can be seen as 
a kind of delegation to an independent neutral organization. In addition, the gold 
standard that prevailed before World War II can be also seen as a type of such 
delegation. 
     Note also that the delegation may not be viewed as bad from the Leviathan 
government’s point of view because only its rate of time preference is changed, and the 
government can still pursue its political objectives. One criticism of the argument that 
central banks should be independent (e.g., Blinder 1998) is that, since the 
time-inconsistency problem argued in Kydland and Prescott (1977) or Barro and 
Gordon (1983) is more acute with fiscal policy, why is it not also necessary to delegate 
fiscal policies? An economically Leviathan government, however, will never allow 
fiscal policies to be delegated to an independent neutral organization because the 
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Leviathan government would then not be able to pursue its political objectives, which in 
a sense would mean the death of the Leviathan government. The median household that 
backs the Leviathan government, but at the same time dislikes high inflation, will 
therefore support the delegation of authority but only if it concerns monetary policy. 
The independent central bank will then be given the authority to control Gθ  and oblige 
the government to change Gθ in order to meet the target rate of inflation. 
     Without such a delegation of authority, it is likely that generally PG θθ >  
because Gθ  represents the median household whereas Pθ  represents the mean 
household. Empirical research indicates that the rate of time preference negatively 
correlates with permanent income (e.g., Lawrance 1991), and the permanent income of 
the median household is usually lower than that of the mean household. If generally 
PG θθ > , that suggests that inflation will tend to accelerate unless a central bank is 
independent. The independence of the central bank is therefore very important in 
keeping the path of inflation stable. The degree of independence has varied across 
countries and time periods, which may offer an explanation for why various types of 
inflation have been generated. The level of central bank independence is therefore very 
important in explaining the nature of various types of inflation. 
     Note also that the forced adjustments of Gθ  by an independent central bank are 
exogenous shocks to both the government and the representative household because 
they are planned solely by the central bank. When a shock on Gθ  is given, the 
government and the representative household must recalculate their optimal paths 
including the path of inflation by, for example, resetting Gθ , π0 , and t in equation (13).     
 
V. TYPES OF INFLATION 
 
1. The basic mechanism 
     The path of inflation consists of three movements: acceleration, constant, and 
deceleration. All types of inflation can be explained simply by combining these three 
movements. Equation (13) indicates that, if PG θθ > , inflation accelerates; if PG θθ = , 
inflation is constant; and if PG θθ < , inflation decelerates. Hence, various types of 
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inflation can be explained by the magnitude of Gθ  in relation to Pθ . For example, 
hyperinflation can be explained by PG θθ > , chronic inflation by a combination of 
periods in which the relationship between Gθ  and Pθ  sporadically changes from 
PG θθ >  to PG θθ =  and back again, disinflation by a combination of periods in which 
alternately PG θθ <  and PG θθ = , low and stable inflation by PG θθ = , and deflation 
by PG θθ < .  
     To cover all types of inflation, various combinations of periods in which PG θθ > , 
PG θθ = , and PG θθ <  are necessary, which implies that Gθ  should be time variable 
and change frequently. However, preferences do not seem to change frequently by their 
nature. If a government does not change its preference frequently, only three types of 
inflation— hyperinflation ( PG θθ > ), stable inflation ( PG θθ = ), and deflation 
( PG θθ < )—would usually be observed. In reality, chronic inflation and disinflation and 
their variants have not been rare, which suggests that, other than the government itself, 
there is another important force that changes Gθ . A central bank also can control Gθ  
to the extent of its degree of independence. Hence, the types of inflation varies 
according to relative magnitudes of Gθ  and Pθ  and the degree of central bank 
independence.  
 
2. The mechanisms of various types of inflation 
2.1. Hyperinflation 
     Equation (13) implies that, if Gθ  is significantly higher than usual, 
hyperinflation will be generated in a very short period.12 Faced with significantly 
higher Gθ , people expect extremely high inflation and inflation explodes as equation 
                                                        
12 When Gθ  is significantly high, the weight ò-tt tv
tt
dvB
B
1 ,
,  in Rt is much larger than ò-
-
t
t tv
tt
dvB
B
1 ,
,1  and 
thus Rt will be closer to rdsπt
t s
+ò +1  than rdsdvπtt ss v +ò ò- +1 1 . Hence, the path of inflation will be 
closer to ( )tθθππ PGt -+= 20  than ( ) 20 3 tθθππ PGt -+= . 
 23
(13) indicates. The value of money ( ) dssθθπdsπ tPGt s òò -+= 0 200 3
11
( ) 30
1
tθθπ PG -+
=  
rapidly declines to nil.13 What factors would contribute to a significantly higher Gθ  
than usual? Hyperinflation has often been observed when governments were very 
fragile and unstable, for example, after a defeat in war or after a revolution. Germany 
after WWI, Japan and Hungary after WWII, and Russia after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union are typical examples of hyperinflation. If a government is fragile and unstable, 
not only households but the government itself will anticipate that the regime may soon 
collapse. If the probability of the end of regime is very high, it is likely that the 
government will behave very myopically (e.g., Fisher 1930; Yaari 1965). The 
government will not put a high value on the future, but it will struggle to survive in the 
present. It is not likely to listen to the advice of a central bank. The very fragile and 
unstable government’s considerably myopic behavior will cause extremely high 
inflation expectations and then hyperinflation by equation (13). This explanation 
appears more natural than Cagan’s (1956) hyperinflation model, in which it is suggested 
that hyperinflation basically occurs irrespective of the fragility or stability of the 
government.  
     Equation (13) also implies another type of hyperinflation. Even if Gθ  is not 
significantly high, hyperinflation will eventually be observed if no action is taken when 
there are relatively large positive values of PG θθ - . The hyperinflation observed in 
some countries in South America for the past several decades?sometimes called 
“modern hyperinflation”?may be examples of this type of hyperinflation. The situation 
in which relatively large positive values of PG θθ - are left as they are implies that a 
central bank is only somewhat independent. The combination of a more myopic 
government than usual and a dependent central bank will generate this type of 
hyperinflation.  
     Equation (13) indicates that hyperinflation is not caused by the growth of money 
                                                        
13 If Gθ  is significantly high and thus the path of inflation is close to ( )tθθππ PGt -+= 20 , then the 
value of money declines by ( ) dssθθπdsπ tPGt s òò -+= 000 2
11
( ) 20
1
tθθπ PG -+
= . 
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(i.e., not by seigniorage) but by the unusually myopic preference of a government 
combined with a scarcely independent central bank. This view is consistent with the 
conclusions of Sargent and Wallace (1973) and Fischer et al. (2002). They conclude that 
causation runs from inflation to money growth during hyperinflation, and that once high 
inflation has been triggered, monetary policy has typically been accommodative, as 
equation (14) implies. The explanation is also consistent with Sargent’s (1982) view 
that a credible change in policies, preferably embedded in legal and institutional 
changes, could bring a hyperinflation to an end at a very small cost. Sargent (1982) 
implies that the main cause of hyperinflation is the behavior of government. Equation 
(13) indicates that, if the incumbent government is replaced with or changes itself into a 
government that has a much lower rate of time preference and/or if the authority to set 
and keep the target rate of inflation is delegated to a truly independent neutral 
organization that is obliged to stabilize the price level, high inflation expectations soon 
subside and the ongoing hyperinflation will be brought to an end at a small cost.  
     Equation (13) also indicates that the mechanism of hyperinflation can be 
explained without any ad hoc assumption of irrationality or friction, whereas Cagan’s 
(1956) well-known hyperinflation model needs the assumption of adaptive expectations 
or some ad hoc frictions if large budget deficits are allowed in the model (e.g., 
Auernheimer 1976; Evans and Yarrow 1981; Kiguel 1989). Equation (13) indicates that 
hyperinflation is nothing more than a consequence of a deep parameter (i.e., the time 
preference rate of government) taking various values, and no additional or special 
mechanism is necessary to explain it. 
      
2.2. Chronic inflation  
     Chronic inflation occurs when relatively high rates of inflation are sustained for a 
relatively long period. Many industrialized countries experienced chronic inflation in 
the 1960s and 1970s, and this period is often called the Great Inflation. Equation (13) 
indicates that chronic inflation will be observed if there is a combination of sporadic 
periods in which PG θθ >  and regular periods in which PG θθ = . Once a positive 
PG θθ -  is allowed (even for a short period), equation (13) indicates that inflation will 
start to accelerate. The acceleration will stop when PG θθ =  is restored. However, the 
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higher rate of inflation and higher inflation expectations are retained because PG θθ <  is 
necessary to lower inflation.  
     The combination of sporadic periods in which PG θθ >  and regular periods in 
which PG θθ =  implies that a central bank is not sufficiently independent. This type of 
central bank cannot sufficiently control Gθ  and will sometimes fail to prevent the 
occurrence of a situation in which PG θθ >  because PG θθ >  is generally true by nature. 
Moreover, because of insufficient independence, the central bank usually will not be 
able to force the government to lower Gθ  so far as PG θθ <  even if PG θθ <  is 
necessary for inflation to decline. As a result, the combination of a relatively more 
myopic government and an insufficiently independent central bank can generate chronic 
inflation.    
     Once the condition in which PG θθ >  is allowed, the target rate of inflation needs 
to be raised by equation (14) unless PG θθ <  is forced sufficiently lower. Clarida et al. 
(2000), Favero and Rovelli (2001), and Dennis (2001) conclude that the target rate of 
inflation in the pre-Volker era was much higher than that in the Volker-Greenspan era. 
Equation (14) suggests that the reason why the central banks at the time set high 
inflation targets is not because they deliberately committed the “crime” of high inflation. 
Instead, they were forced to raise the target rates of inflation because they were not 
sufficiently independent.14  
     Even if only partially independent, a central bank will not give up its attempts to 
force a government to lower Gθ  so that PG θθ <  and to prevent the already high rate of 
inflation from exploding. In some cases, the central bank may succeed in achieving 
periods in which PG θθ < . Sporadic changes among periods in which PG θθ > , PG θθ = , 
and PG θθ <  will make the path of inflation zigzag, that is, the path of inflation will 
have several or more trend breaks during periods of chronic inflation. Several or more 
                                                        
14 Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) and Barro and Gordon’s (1983) well-known explanation for chronic 
inflation needs exceptionally large or successive negative supply shocks and thus needs internationally 
common such shocks to explain the international aspect of the Great Inflation. It is hard to find such 
shocks in many industrialized countries during the Great Inflation. The explanation in this paper can 
explain the international aspect of the Great Inflation without assuming such shocks because it concerns 
only the attitudes of the government and the central banks. The governments and central banks in most 
industrialized countries during the Great Inflation seem to have assumed common, respective attitudes 
because the economic policies conducted in the United States were often imitated by other countries. 
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trend breaks suggest that inflation looks like a random walk during periods of chronic 
inflation (see, e.g., Barsky 1987; Evans and Watchel 1993).  
 
2.3. Disinflation 
     Disinflation occurs when there is a gradual transition from a high rate of inflation 
to a low and stable rate of inflation, but the decline does not reach deflation. A typical 
episode was experienced in many industrialized countries in the 1980s after the Great 
Inflation. Equation (13) indicates that disinflation will be observed when the condition 
of PG θθ <  is gradually adjusted to one in which PG θθ =  as the rate of inflation 
declines to a low and stable rate. 
     A truly independent central bank is necessary for disinflation because Gθ  must 
be gradually shifted from PG θθ <  to PG θθ = . A government will not be able to 
discipline itself to keep PG θθ <  because the opposite condition ( PG θθ > ) is generally 
true by nature. In contrast, this gradual adjustment can be easily implemented by a truly 
independent central bank because they can force the government to keep PG θθ < , and 
the central bank can gradually tune the target rate of inflation as well as Gθ  as inflation 
cools down. Eventually the rate of inflation will land softly at a low and stable rate.  
     In the above disinflation path, there is often a point at which a central bank 
abruptly becomes truly independent. Taylor (2001, 2002) emphasizes the importance of 
changes in economic and political leadership as a cause of the Great Inflation by 
quoting Milton Friedman, who argued that the Great Inflation was a fundamentally 
political, not economic, phenomenon and that Ronald Reagan ended the Great Inflation 
by accepting a severe recession without bringing pressure on the Federal Reserve to 
reverse course. Similarly, Meltzer (2005) emphasizes the large role of political decision- 
making during the Great Inflation and concludes that the Federal Reserve was better 
able to control inflation during the administrations of Presidents Eisenhower and 
Reagan rather than those of Presidents Johnson, Carter, or Nixon. In other words, 
keeping the independence of the central bank is the key to stabilizing inflation. This 
view is consistent with the explanation for disinflation offered in this paper. 
     Gradual adjustments of Gθ  suggest that the path of inflation may have several or 
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more trend breaks during disinflations, particularly if Gθ  is adjusted on a step-by-step 
basis, and then inflation may look like a random walk during disinflations. However, if 
Gθ  is adjusted very smoothly, without any signs of a trend break, inflation may look 
less like a random walk. 
 
2.4. Low and stable inflation 
     Equation (13) indicates that if π0 initially is low and PG θθ =  is maintained, then 
a low and stable rate of inflation will be sustained. A truly independent central bank is 
necessary for low and stable inflation because it forces the government to keep PG θθ =  
completely and indefinitely. Once the central bank succeeds in achieving the condition 
PG θθ =  continuously at the target rate of inflation (i.e., inflation is stabilized at the 
target rate), the central bank need not frequently adjust Gθ  anymore. The path of 
inflation will therefore have only a few small-scale trend breaks, which suggests that 
inflation will look less like a random walk (see, e.g., Barsky 1987; Evans and Watchel 
1993; Cogley and Sargent 2002; Levin and Piger 2002). 
 
2.5 Deflation 
     Equation (13) indicates that, if the condition in which PG θθ <  continues over 
time, deflation will eventually occur. Nevertheless, deflation will be rarely observed 
because generally PG θθ >  by nature and because it is unlikely that a central bank 
would dare to attempt deflation and set a target rate of deflation.15 In fact, among the 
industrialized countries, only Japan in the 1990s and 2000s experienced deflation after 
World War II.  
     How can deflation occur if PG θθ >  by nature and a central bank exerts itself to 
hold PG θθ =  for a positive target rate of inflation? A huge negative shock that greatly 
widens the output gap may temporarily make the price level decline, but that would not 
necessarily be regarded as deflation because deflation means a successive decline of the 
price level. The possibility for deflation arises when a shock raises Pθ  to some 
                                                        
15 In the case of the gold standard that prevailed before World War II, deflation may be observed 
relatively more frequently because the gold standard indicates that the target rate of inflation is zero.   
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extent.16 It may rarely happen, but if Pθ  becomes higher and Gθ  stays constant, then 
it is possible for the condition PG θθ <  to occur. If this condition is left unchanged, then 
deflation will be observed by equation (13). The higher Pθ  means a lower level of 
consumption at steady state, and a recession as well as a deflation will generally be 
observed if Pθ  is raised. Nevertheless, if the central bank raises Gθ  so that PG θθ ³  
immediately after the shock, deflation will be prevented. However, if the central bank 
does not respond quickly, deflation will occur.  
     Once deflation takes root, it is very difficult even for a truly independent central 
bank to control Gθ  and reverse the deflation because of the zero bound of the nominal 
interest rate. As shown in section IV, an independent central bank controls Gθ  by 
manipulating the nominal interest rate with the extra rate ψ. Thus, if the central bank 
cannot manipulate the nominal interest rate because of the zero bound, it also cannot 
control Gθ . The central bank may advise the government to raise its preference Gθ  so 
far as PG θθ >  in order to reverse the deflation, but it cannot force the government to 
make PG θθ > .17 Furthermore, if the deflation deepens to a point where the real interest 
rate is compelled to exceed the marginal productivity, the economy cannot achieve a 
stable equilibrium anymore. The Great Depression in the 1930s may have been such a 
case, whereas Japan in the 1990s may have narrowly averted such a situation.18 
     Ahearne et al. (2002) argue that, to prevent deflation like the one experienced in 
Japan in the 1990s, both monetary and fiscal stimulus should go beyond the levels 
conventionally implied. For example, if the Bank of Japan lowered short-term interest 
rates by a further 200 basis points at any time between 1991 and early 1995, deflation 
                                                        
16 Since the era of Böhm-Bawerk and Fisher, the rate of time preference has been naturally regarded as 
time variable. See, for example, Böhm-Bawerk (1889), Fisher (1930), and Uzawa (1968).   
17 Deflation may continue for a long period even if the incumbent government is replaced as long as the 
time preference rates of the median and the representative households became nearly equal due to the 
shock that raised Pθ  and PG θθ @  is kept. However, if the time preference rate of the median 
household is raised similarly to Pθ  due to the shock, then a replacement of government would reverse 
deflation because the newly elected government will have the same high rate of time preference as the 
raised time preference rate of the median household. The election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 
1933 may have been such a case. Nevertheless, even if deflation is reversed, the other problems caused by 
a raised Pθ  will remain.  
18 In the early 1930s, the ex post real interest rate in the United States was roughly 10% (e.g., Bernanke 
1995), whereas that in Japan in the 1990s was generally less than 5% (e.g., Ito 2003). 
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could indeed have been avoided. This view implies that there are unusual incidents 
behind deflation, and it seems consistent with the argument that Pθ  is unusually high in 
case of deflation.19 Equation (13) suggests that, to prevent deflation, it is necessary to 
raise Gθ  above the unusually high Pθ  as soon as possible by imposing an unusually 
large negative extra rate ψ. Thus, deflation will be prevented if a central bank acts 
quickly and decisively, probably as the Federal Reserve under Chairman Greenspan 
attempted during the recession in the early 2000s. However, because shocks that make 
PG θθ -  largely negative seem to occur rarely, even a truly independent central bank 
may fail to respond quickly enough to such a shock owing to a lack of experience. 
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
     In this paper, I explore the mechanism that generates various types of inflation. A 
model that explicitly incorporates the government’s borrowing behavior was 
constructed. The model indicates that, if the time preference rates of an economically 
Leviathan government and the representative household are heterogeneous, they cannot 
achieve simultaneous optimization unless inflation accelerates or decelerates. The 
preferences are usually heterogeneous because the government and the representative 
household represent different households (i.e., the median and mean household, 
respectively). Since this inflation acceleration or deceleration path is optimal for the 
government as well as the representative household, both of them expect inflation to 
accelerate or decelerate if their time preference rates are heterogeneous. Conversely, it 
is not until their time preference rates are heterogeneous that inflation can accelerate or 
decelerate. This inflation acceleration mechanism is a result of the simultaneous 
optimization and does not require any ad hoc friction or irrationality. Thus, the 
mechanism provides a micro-foundation for the explanation for various types of 
inflation. 
     The problem in controlling inflation therefore is neither irrationality nor friction, 
but preference. Controlling one’s own preferences is very difficult without help of an 
                                                        
19 Harashima (2004a) estimates that Pθ  in Japan rose roughly 2% at the end of the 1980s just before the 
deflation during the 1990s and 2000s. 
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independent neutral organization, whether for a person or a government. The 
government uses a central bank as such an independent neutral organization to control 
the government’s preferences. Central banks have different amounts of independence 
and different degrees of power to control the government’s preferences, which in turn 
generates the various paths of inflation. Hence, the various types of inflation can be 
explained by the inflation acceleration mechanism and the various degrees of central 
bank independence, giving us a unified and micro-founded explanation for the various 
types of inflation.  
     The most important point, in terms of price stability, that the explanation implies 
is the necessity of a truly independent central bank. A government usually has different 
preferences from the representative household and, more importantly, can barely control 
its own preferences even if it is fully rational. If a government is left without some 
neutral organization to help control inflation, the risk of considerable acceleration of 
inflation exists. A truly independent central bank is therefore necessary to rein in 
inflation.  
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APPENDIX 
 
1. The condition for approximately identical weights 
     If bt is constant (e.g., if it is at steady state), the weights for tst £<-1  are 
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2. The transversality condition 
     By equations (6) and (12), tG
t
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s
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πrdsdvπR +=+= ò ò- + q1 1  and thus Gtt θπR =-  
at steady state. Substituting the equation Gtt θπR =-  and equation (12) into conditions 
(3) and (4) and solving both differential equations yield the equation 
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Therefore, transversality condition (5) also cannot hold.                         
 
3. Derivation of equation (14) 
     By the Taylor-type instrument rule ( ( ) tx*tπt xγππγγi +-+= ) and the equation 
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     Here, it is assumed for simplicity that the exogenous variables ωt play limited 
roles for inflation and output gaps; thus, αz and βz are near zero and approximately 
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Since ηt, μt, and ξt are i.i.d. shocks with zero mean, then by taking expectations of both 
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Figure 1  Increases in the real obligation of tb  
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Figure 2  Increases in the real obligation of tb , 1tb + , and 2tb +  
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Figure 3  Increases in the real obligation of ( )1s0b s,t1t £<+- at time t 
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